WA Legal Roundup - Div III: Mr. Stabby-pants gets 1st aggro instruction because he was a trespasser; more than guy talking to girl and her getting in car needed for reasonable suspicion of prostitution.
Bea stabbed a guy. Well...cruz wreaked havoc on a guys bathroom in an argument, was shooed out after people got into the bathroom, grabbed a knife...and stabbed a guy. Stabbed him a lot actually.
(This guy really should be writing for Cyanide and Happiness)
Basically, he argued that the prosecution wasn't entitled to the first aggressor instruction. He argued that the aggressors were the people barging in. The court said no, you can be an aggressor by wrecking someone's house, causing the need for them to eject you. There was something in there about possible prosecutorial misconduct. Unfortunately, the judge instructed the jury on argument and there really was no prejudice from the statement.
The other case (State v. Diluzio...I'll save you the linkage) out of the court goes down as such: Guy pulls up to girl and talks with her. Cop sees it. He doesn't know the john, he doesn't know the girl, he just assumes she's hooking (which, by the way, I've always wanted to say ever since seeing D.A.R.Y.L.). Defendant moves to suppress because the officer didn't have a reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances standard:
The facts in Mr. Diluzio's case are similar to those in Doughty and provide even less justification for a stop. Here, as in Doughty, the investigatory stop was based on the officer's observation. The officer saw Mr. Diluzio having a conversation with a woman who got into the passenger side of his vehicle. There was no police informant and the police officer did not see any money change hands and did not overhear any conversations between the two individuals. Neither individual was known to have been involved in prostitution or solicitation activities. These incomplete observations do not provide the basis for a Terry stop.
Even with the officer's 13 years of experience, the location of the stop, and the lack of open businesses or residences, the totality of the circumstances do not support a conclusion of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.