WA Legal Roundup - The triumphant return
In an attempt to quickly catch up, I will provide a short synopsis of what was missed. Unfortunately, this means that, for those of you that track these sorts of things, you will have to look to see who was involved in what. Only the categories will be noted.
While this does not catch me up all the way...its a great start. More to come tomorrow :)
Federal Way School District sought review of a finding that they discharged an employee without cause. The court issued the writ. The court then ruled that the district didn't meet the requirements for review of a district court order and rescinded the writ. Before review, the parties settled. The court of appeals dismissed as moot.
Claims have different interest rates on the judgment. Because this claim was primarily tortious, the rate for tortious conduct governs.
Land use...nerd! (an ordinance regarding park impact fees).
CrRLJ 8.3(b) allows for dismissal for government misconduct that prejudices the accused. It does not provide expressly for evidence suppression. "We hold suppression of evidence is not an available remedy under CrRLJ 8.3(b). We also hold that the writ is available to correct errors of law and that the superior court erred in denying the writ." 'Nuff said.
Mills was quite the verbally abusive professor. At a closed hearing, he was suspended for two quarters without pay. He argued vagueness of the statute and other free speech issues. The court of appeals held that his free speech rights were not violated and the university violated the APA by performing a closed hearing.
Ch. 10.99 RCW classifies certain crimes as domestic violent crimes. Hagler hooked up with a girl over 20 years his junior, gave her gifts when she let him live there and use her car, and then assaulted her and forced her into prostitution for "repayment". Hagler had asked the court not to inform the jury about the domestic violent designation of the charge. There's nothing in the statute regarding if you should tell the jury this. The designation need not be proven under Blakely. The court stated that, while it is technically not error to do so, that it might result in prejudice in some cases. Thus, it is not advisable to bring the designation in. However, doing so in this case was harmless.
Rahman was injured as an unauthorized passenger in a state vehicle. Mohammad, an intern and her husband, was asked to travel to Spokane to assist in an inspection and was given a state vehicle to do so. The night before the inspection, Rahman was ill and lonely, and asked her husband to pick her up so she could go with him on the trip. The state policy forbids passengers not on official state business. On the way to Spokane, the car left the roadway, injuring Rahman badly. The issue, of course, comes down to whether the state is vicariously liable for the actions of Mohammad. The trial court ruled that there was not vicarious liability.
Division III looked to McNew v. Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co., 37 Wn.2d 495, 497-98, 224 P.2d 627 (1950):
The general trend of authority is in the direction of holding that, where the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business the employee was actually engaged in when a third person was injured, and the employer will be held responsible unless it clearly appears that the employee could not have been directly or indirectly serving his employer; also the fact that the predominant motive of the employee is to benefit himself does not prevent the act from being within the course or scope of employment, and if the purpose of serving the employer's business actuates the employee to any appreciable extent, the employer is subject to liability if the act otherwise is within the service.
The court also looked to the policy that breaking company policy necessarily renders actions outside of course and scope. Thus, the court rejected the Restatement (Second) of Agency s. 242, which has never been adopted, or even cited, in Washington. As a distinguishing factor, the court noted that Rahman was in the passenger area, not in areas completely unsuitable for passengers (cargo area, runner-boards). The state was vicariously responsible in this case.
Alford pleas, sentencing, and a complex criminal procedural history. Look this one up Crim Law peeps...especially if you work with SVPs. I don't have the time necessary to decipher it for you :(
Allen thought violating a no-contact order somehow fell within double jeopardy. The court did remand for sentencing within the guidelines however.
SSY stomped a kid and took his iPod. He argued merger of the assault with the robbery. The court held that it didn't violate double jeopardy, but remanded for a determination of whether RCW 13.40.180(1) might reduce his sentence.
If one spouse does not know of a benefit, it can assert a right to that benefit upon finding out, regardless of whether it is one year beyond the entry of dissolution.
The Kinneys alleged a January 2000 contract breach stemming from Cook's using the corporation to which the Kinney's held shares, as a guarantee on a loan to another company Mr. Cook owned. The Kinney's argued the discovery rule as to when they discovered or should have discovered the loan. However, the discovery rule in contracts cases is very limited, and the court refused to extend it beyond the confines of Architechtonics Construction Management, Inc. v. Khorram, 111 Wn. App. 725, 45 P.3d 1142 (2002).
Drug house. Drug money taken. Drug convictions reversed. Who getsthe money? Because its civil, its still an issue of fact. Of course, any fourth amendment rulings in the criminal case will also apply to the quasi-criminal forfeiture under our Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The rest of the opinion comes down to whether an issue of fact exists, and that part is boring. So I will not talk about it.
WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT
Once a certificate of liability is canceled, an LLC cannot be sued. Period.
The State has no duty to defend Justice Sanders when he gets called before the Commission on Judicial Conduct.
For all you securities junkies: "We conclude that Washington follows the Delaware demand futility standard and the reasoning of Ryan."
Intent to inflict great bodily harm transfers to unintended victims under RCW 9A.36.011 (assault in the first degree).
The officer ascertained that the item in Garvin's pants was not a weapon, but squeezed the coin purse until some meath fell out of it in the pocket. The court ruled that this was going beyond the bounds of Terry.