WA Legal Roundup - Playing Catch Up
Yes, the Prof has been trying to balance way too much on his plate, then balance two other plates similarly full. I'm no greasy spoon waitress, and this plate got dropped. So here's all that's been missed, plus a little new fodder. I will never let 19 opinions accumulate again...talk about HELL:
Washington State Supreme Court
There are a lot more people involved, but I will break this down. A wants to buy property from B. B enjoins the sale. The agreement expires. A wants to buy property from B. B tells A, sorry, the agreement expired. A tells B "The only reason it expired was you enjoined me from buying it!" A goes to court, the court and court of appeals judicially estop B. The Supreme Court per curiam says otherwise:
In seeking to enjoin the sale in November 2005, Harting took no position on the continued validity of the purchase and sale agreement or its termination clause. She asserted only that Granberg could not then sell the property on behalf of Elmer Duff's estate because her mother had a community interest in the property. The trial court enjoined Granberg from conveying the property until each estate's respective interest was determined at trial. In later proceedings, Harting asserted that the agreement had expired. These are not clearly inconsistent positions. Indeed, when Harting sought the injunction, the agreement had not yet expired. Thus, the first factor of the judicial estoppel analysis does not favor estoppel.
Nor does the second core factor support judicial estoppel. There would have been no perception that the trial court had been misled had it agreed with Harting's later assertion that the agreement had expired. The court correctly granted an injunction because Harting had a potential interest in the property. By accepting Harting's later assertion that the agreement subsequently expired, the trial court's earlier decision would not be called into question. Rather, the perception would be that the agreement expired after the injunction was granted.
Judicial estoppel therefore does not apply here. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Bradley plead, but his offender score was miscalculated when represented to him. Thus,the plea is involuntary. In this case, the plea was also indivisible.
The sentencing court relied on the prosecutor's representation of Mendoza's criminal history. Mendoza did not stipulate to the history, and the prosecutor put on no evidence of that history. Mendoza did not object, his attorney acknowledging that he had read the statement of the prosecutor. The court allowed the challenge despite no objection. This cures an interdivision conflict in that regard. The dissent would have taken the position that the acknowledgement by defense counsel amounted to a waiver.
An offender score was calculated correctly. That is all.
Imm was returning from a coffee break in a school district vehicle. He hit black ice and collided with Melin-Schilling. Melin-Schilling alleged respondeat superior by way of course and scope of employment. The district responded that it had not been given notice of the tort claim. Melin-Schilling was granted leave to amend to plead in the alternative that Imm was not acting within the course and scope. The district was dismissed under the tort claim statute, but Imm was as well, though it was alleged he was acting outside the course and scope.
The court held that as a matter of law Imm was within the course and scope of his employment because the district knew where everyone took their breaks and approved because the district could reach everyone there and it was within the service district.
The Hughes planted trees a long time ago. It caused the sidewalk to raise and Rosengren fractured her wrist. The trees, because they were planted, were an artificial condition on the land, imposing a duty on the Hughes:
A property owner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care that no part of any trees planted by the owner poses an unreasonable risk of harm to the pedestrian using the abutting sidewalk.
LC, LLC is an interpreter referral service. They do not pay the interpreters. Employment Security tried to classify LC as an employer of the interpreters and subject them to payment of unemployment insurance contributions. Before you can be subjected to those payment, you have to be the one paying the employees. Reversed.
The prosecutor issued a sworn certification for determination of probable cause for raping an 11 year old girl. The court found there was probable cause. Probable cause is all that is needed to get DNA. No error.
To convict, jury instructions must instruct on every element. This was done here. Nothing groundbreaking.
A druggy and her boyfriend starved a child. The statute said "child or dependent person". She tried to argue that because she was charged as to a dependent person and not as to a child (which the victim was), that she should get off. Nope. The terms are not mutually exclusive.
Martin pleaded guilty to second degree assault and attempted rape based on his conduct at a boarding home against one of its female residents. Though the plea was indivisible, there still exists double jeopardy in convicting twice for the same conduct. The court vacated the lesser of the convictions.
Oddly enough, you are not "in the community" when you are incarcerated for a probation violation. You don't get to wash out a conviction unless you do your five years in the community.
This isn't a land use decision...but its close. Clean groundwater. While I won't outright call someone a nerd who reads this...you better watch your step. Water law peeps...you're on thin ice. Same with you environmentalists. Feel free to read if you like those kind of things.
Strippers had their licenses suspended for one year for touching undercover officers. The statute allowed suspension of up to a year. But the person responsible for issuing the suspensions could not think of an instance where she would allow less than a year suspension. Guess who got caught being arbitrary and capricious? By failing to exercise any discretion, she abused her discretion.
Yes Toney, you can appeal a second time after remand for resentencing. However, without error, your sentence stands.
Continuing to accept rent after 3 15-day notices amounts to waiver of your MHLTA (Mobile Home Landlord Tenant Act) right to evict. With the third notice, get them out!
You need exigent circumstances to enter a home without a warrant. Here, the police suspected Hinshaw of having driven while intoxicated. The factors to be considered are:
(1) the gravity of the offense, particularly whether it is violent; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether police have reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect is guilty; (4) there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises; (5) the suspect is likely to escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) the entry is made peacefully; (7) the police are in hot pursuit; (8) the suspect is fleeing; (9) the officers or public are in danger; (10) the suspect has access to a vehicle; and (11) there is a risk that the police will lose evidence.
. . .
The police here presented no evidence of a major crisis demanding immediate entry into Mr. Hinshaw's home. The record shows that police had probable cause to believe Mr. Hinshaw had become intoxicated and had driven home where he remained. The reckless operation of the car and consequent threat to public safety had ended. There was no suggestion that Mr. Hinshaw was armed or dangerous. He posed no threat, imminent or otherwise, to the safety of the officers or the public. His car was essentially disabled and police had last seen him on a bicycle. He was not fleeing or seeking to escape. Finally, the circumstances here did not involve violence or threats of violence. His offense had not harmed anyone, he had merely damaged property.
Sloan argued: "(1) the amended information was unconstitutionally vague; (2) the "to convict" instruction misstated the law; (3) the evidence does not support his conviction because his wife's friend, not his wife, answered his telephone call; and (4) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance."
The only real contention was whether the friend answer constituted his wife's "hearing" the call. The wife heard it standing next to her friend. That's enough. Affirmed.
WWC bought underground tanks in 1991. It was insured by Ohio Casualty from 1990-1992. The tanks leaked and WWC asserted its coverage. The theory was that the tanks were improperly installed. However, the coverage was for property damage, and the property damage didn't occur until the tanks leaked. Sorry WWC, coverage denied.